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83-1932/4

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REMARKS

attached are two papers
on Security Overseas that
John might discuss with
Eagleburger.

This was the only subject
that I would suggest raising
(over)

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Room No.—Bldg.

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
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OS REESTRY
FILE *See 6*

14 September 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Assistant/DDCI

83-1932/2

FROM: Harry E. Fitzwater
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Status of Efforts to Improve State
Department's Security Program Overseas

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1. This Office and the Office of Security would encourage the DDCI to meet with Larry Eagleburger, as suggested at the 18 July 1983 Executive Committee meeting, on the subject of security conditions overseas. Should such a meeting occur, the following talking points are suggested:

- ° Department of State Security (SY) and the Agency's Office of Security see eye-to-eye on what needs to be done in the matter of overseas security and both offices are highly motivated for the proper ends. Additionally, SY and the Office of Security have been and are enjoying excellent rapport in their working relationships.

- ° The feeling is strong here that special efforts to enhance security overseas that do not work through the conduit of State SY are doomed to failure. The mission is SY's and the resources that are directed at the problem should end up in SY's control.

- ° Newly appointed Ambassadors, prior to taking their posts overseas, must be brought to an awareness of the security threats overseas and brought to a point of precondition to support defensive practices on behalf of security, counterintelligence and safety.

- ° A newly formed organization called the Inter-agency Working Group on Overseas Security Programs, made up of the Directors of Security of Intelligence agencies overseas, gives high promise of productive results in dealing with the instant challenge. This organization should be given formal recognition and

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possibly a formal charter by the Department of State. The Chairman of this organization is Mr. Marvin L. Garrett, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State.

- ° The Department of State's Security Enhancement Program should be deactivated as soon as possible and its resources turned over to State SY.

- ° Greater efforts and closer cooperation are needed to assure that new office building activities get early and proper coordination at all the crucial architectural and design phases.

- ° There should be support to the idea that each American post overseas should be housed in a free-standing building within a compound wherever possible.

- ° Minimum standards for perimeter controls should be established and implemented at each overseas post.

- ° Minimum standards for Chancery walls, windows, and doors should be established and implemented at each post.

- ° A Personnel Access Control System (PACS) should be installed at the entrance of each overseas post.

- ° A safehaven (other than Post Communication Center) should be established at each post. Each safehaven should be equipped with communication equipment and a means of escaping from the safehaven other than the primary entrance to it.

- ° An intra-post communication capability should be established at each overseas post.

- ° An adequate emergency generator power system should be located at each overseas post. Each generator and attendant fuel supply should be afforded adequate protection.

- ° Strict control over foreign national employees overseas should be established and a general reduction in the presence of such persons should be a jointly-held goal.

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- Additional seabees should be recruited and assigned for duty at posts with construction going on.

- An emergency reaction team must be formed to respond quickly to post emergencies overseas. Individuals with appropriate backgrounds from the Agency, from State, from NSA, and from the Delta Force could be involved.

- A secure voice capability between Washington and overseas posts should be built and deployed.

2. The Office of Security feels that, since the Beirut bombing, significant progress has been made between the Agency and SY in the matter of planning for the future of security overseas.

Harry E. Fitzwater

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